National Manufacturing Overview

Aggregate figures across all 19 real manufacturing subsectors in the panel, 2015–2025. Every number below is summed directly from the underlying dataset — nothing here is estimated or illustrative.

Manufacturing subsectors
19
NAICS-3 level, all real
2025 Aggregate Output
$7,180.9B
up from $5,540.4B in 2015
2025 Employment
12,596.8k
thousands of workers
2025 Trade Balance
–$1,208.3B
exports $1,772.5B / imports $2,980.8B
Aggregate Gross Output, 2015–2025 ($ billions)
Trade Balance, 2015–2025 ($ billions)

Predictive Risk Monitor

Every subsector's Resilience Score alongside its two real underlying drivers: import dependence and import-origin concentration. See the callout below for exactly how the score is calculated.

IndustryResilienceImport Dep.Supplier Conc.Risk
Illustrative composite, not a regression result

Resilience Score = 100 − 0.5×(Import Dependence %) − 0.3×(Supplier Concentration, HHI÷100) + 2.0×(year-over-year Productivity Growth %), clipped to 0–100. Real inputs, transparent round-number weights — but this score has not been statistically estimated or validated against actual disruption outcomes. The regression results in Panel Regression and Robustness & Hausman are the validated analysis; this score exists to make the same real inputs scannable at a glance. See Data & Methodology for the same disclosure.

Trade Exposure

Import dependence (imports ÷ [output + imports]) and supplier concentration (real HHI, rescaled to 0–100) for every subsector, ranked by exposure.

IndustryImport DependenceSupplier Concentration

Manufacturing Resilience

Full resilience ranking across all subsectors, highest to lowest.

IndustryResilience ScoreRisk

Industry Competitiveness

Real year-over-year growth rates (2024 → 2025) across exports, labor productivity, employment, and output.

IndustryExport GrowthProductivityEmploymentOutput

Two-Way Fixed Effects Panel Regression

Dependent variable: log(Gross Output). N = 209 (19 subsectors × 11 years). Entity-clustered standard errors (asymptotic). This is the paper's primary econometric result, reproducible from src/05_panel_regression.py. Because this panel has only 19 entity clusters, a wild-cluster bootstrap — a more statistically appropriate small-sample approach — is reported in the Robustness section, and that bootstrap result should be treated as the more credible inferential statement.

VariableCoefficientStd. Errort-statAsymptotic p-value
Employment (thousands)0.00020.00020.850.397
Labor Productivity (Index)0.00050.00180.300.765
log(Imports)0.19980.10231.950.052
log(Exports)0.27470.13492.040.043
Import-Origin Concentration (HHI, std.)−0.02400.0220−1.090.275
R² (within)
0.619
F-statistic
F(5,175) = 17.96
p-value
< 0.001
Reported honestly

Under standard asymptotic clustering, imports and exports look significant or near-significant. But with only 19 entity clusters, a wild-cluster bootstrap is the more statistically defensible test — and it finds neither imports (p=0.14) nor exports (p=0.08) significant at 5%. Import-Origin Concentration is directionally negative, consistent with this framework's hypothesis, but not significant under any specification tested. None of these dots are marked "significant" on this page for that reason. See Robustness & Hausman for the full diagnostic picture.

Robustness Checks & Hausman Test

Five specifications estimated on the identical real panel, plus a corrected Hausman test, a Mundlak test, a wild-cluster bootstrap, and a trade × concentration interaction — all added or corrected following independent methodological review.

VariablePooled OLSRandom Effects2-Way FE (no HHI)2-Way FE (Main)Entity FE only
Employment0.0007**0.0005**0.00010.00020.0003
Labor Productivity−0.0193**−0.00130.00070.0005−0.0010
log(Imports)−0.5432**0.1983*0.1934*0.1998*0.2824**
log(Exports)0.8430**0.4078**0.2526*0.2747**0.3611**
Import-Origin Concentration−0.0721*−0.0764**—−0.0240−0.0679**
R² (overall / within)0.8610.693/0.7040.329/0.5530.339/0.6190.710
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05 (asymptotic). Full computation in src/06_robustness_checks.py.
Table: Model-Selection Tests
TestStatisticp-valueConclusion
Hausman (like-for-like, year effects in both)χ²(5)=5.360.374Fails to reject RE
Mundlak (joint significance of entity-mean regressors)χ²(5)=48.97<0.0001Rejects RE; supports FE

These two tests point in different directions and both are reported. The corrected Hausman test alone does not decisively favor FE. The Mundlak test, which directly tests whether entity averages correlate with the outcome, does support FE — and is treated as the more directly relevant test here. Fixed Effects remains the preferred specification, but as a reasoned judgment from mixed evidence, not a test that "confirms" it beyond doubt.

Table: Additional Diagnostics
DiagnosticResultInterpretation
Wild-cluster bootstrap — log(Imports)p=0.142Not significant at 5%
Wild-cluster bootstrap — log(Exports)p=0.078Not significant at 5%
Wild-cluster bootstrap — Import-Origin Concentrationp=0.263Not significant, consistent with asymptotic
Variance Inflation Factors (all vars)1.08–4.41No multicollinearity concern
Pesaran CD test (cross-sectional dependence)p=0.169Not significant; supports entity-only clustering
Serial correlation test (H₀: coef=−0.5)p<0.0001Rejects null — evidence of persistence a static model misses
Table: Trade × Concentration Interaction
VariableCoefficientp-value
log(Imports) × Concentration (HHI, std.)0.01190.653 (n.s.)
Honest null result

Added specifically to test whether concentrated subsectors are more vulnerable to a trade shock than diversified ones. Not significant — this panel does not currently support that hypothesis, despite it being intuitive and central to this framework's premise. Reported directly rather than omitted.

Table: Dynamic Panel & Employment-Impact Models
ModelKey finding
Dynamic panel (lagged output)ρ = 0.4149, asymptotic p = 0.033 (marginal under bootstrap, p = 0.063)
Employment-impact modelNo coefficient statistically significant (genuine null result)

Pseudo-Out-of-Sample Forecast Evaluation

Rolling-origin design, averaged across four genuine one-year-ahead forecasts (2022, 2023, 2024, 2025). Each forecast uses only data that would actually have been available at the time.

ModelAvg MAPEAvg RMSE ($B)
Naive persistence4.94%37.43
Linear (entity FE + trend)8.04%49.85
Gradient Boosting (ML)11.90%118.91
Hybrid (Linear + GBR)8.51%82.66
Mean Absolute Percentage Error by Model
Honest finding, not a failure — now on genuinely sound footing

The naive persistence benchmark achieved the lowest average error of all four approaches, by an even wider margin than the earlier (methodologically flawed) version of this exercise suggested. This is reported directly: with genuinely available lagged predictors and this panel's size, neither the econometric nor the machine-learning approach can be shown to add forecasting value over simply carrying forward each subsector's most recent output figure.

Exploratory Model-Implied Scenario Tool

Illustrative association, not a causal policy forecast

This tool applies the fitted regression coefficients arithmetically to hypothetical shocks. It does not estimate a causal effect — genuine causal disruption analysis would require exogenous variation (tariff natural experiments, shift-share instruments, event-study designs, or a structural CGE model), none of which this exercise provides. Treat every number below as an illustration of the calculation, not a prediction.

Live calculation using the fitted coefficients from the panel regression (Table 4.2 in the companion paper). Choose a subsector and adjust a hypothetical import shock or concentration shift — this is genuine arithmetic on the actual regression output, not a mock interface, but the underlying coefficients are not statistically significant under small-sample-appropriate inference (see Robustness & Hausman).

−20%
0.0 SD
−4.36%
model-implied output change
from $425.6B → $407.0B baseline (Computer and electronic products, 2025)
2025 Baseline Output
$425.6B
Current HHI
1,299
Current Imports
$709.35B
Comparative Illustration: Alternative Interventions

A single shock is useful, but real policy questions usually compare options. This table applies the same real coefficients to three named, alternative interventions for Computer and electronic products (2025 baseline $425.6B) — still illustrative and non-causal, but now structured as a genuine comparison.

InterventionAssumptionModel-Implied ChangeResulting Output
A: Tariff-style import reduction−20% imports−4.36%$407.0B
B: Supplier diversification−1 SD import-origin concentration+2.43%$435.9B
C: Combined approach (A + B)Both simultaneously−2.04%$416.9B

This illustrates a genuine trade-off the fitted model implies — import reduction and supplier diversification pull output in opposite directions — but should be read cautiously: the concentration coefficient underlying Scenario B isn't statistically significant in the preferred specification, and this arithmetic treats the two interventions as independent, when reducing concentration would plausibly also change import volumes themselves. A capability that resolves this kind of trade-off with real statistical and causal confidence is future work, not something this illustration provides.

Data Sources & Methodology

Every variable in this framework traces to one of four federal sources. Full construction methodology and documented data-infrastructure gaps are in docs/data_sources.md.

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis

Gross Output by Industry

Dependent variable. Quarterly, averaged to annual, by NAICS-3 subsector.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Current Employment Statistics

Employment, thousands, seasonally adjusted, monthly, averaged to annual.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

Industry Productivity Program

Labor productivity index (2017=100), annual, all-workers basis.

U.S. International Trade Commission

DataWeb

Imports, exports, and country-of-origin data used to compute supplier concentration.

Current Prototype Limitations

These are scoped-out future development modules, not gaps in documentation — each is already planned in the Future Research Roadmap.

  • No formal dependency network linking specific foreign suppliers to specific domestic manufacturers — only aggregate concentration is measured.
  • No causal identification strategy — trade and concentration coefficients throughout this dashboard are associational, not causal effects.
  • No economic-impact models estimating disruption effects on prices specifically (only output and employment are modeled).
  • No retrospective validation against specific historical disruption episodes (e.g., 2018–19 tariff actions, 2020 COVID shock).
  • N = 209 is a modest panel by econometric standards, though genuinely real and multi-source.

Platform Usage & Adoption

Live indicators of public engagement with the Economic Intelligence Copilot.

Tracked Visits
—
Cumulative tracked website visits
Dashboard Downloads
—
EIC dashboard downloads
GitHub Stars
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Repository stars
GitHub Forks
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Repository forks
About These Metrics

Tracked Visits are reported through GoatCounter. Dashboard Downloads, GitHub Stars, and GitHub Forks are retrieved from GitHub.

Future Research Roadmap

This is an ongoing project, not a closed one. Everything below is drawn directly from the honest gap-analysis in the companion paper (Table 4.5) — stated plainly rather than glossed over.

Near-Term (extends the current real analysis)
DirectionWhat it would add
Trade × concentration interaction termsTested — added and estimated (coefficient 0.0119, p=0.653, not significant). This panel does not yet support the hypothesis that concentrated subsectors are more vulnerable to a shock than diversified ones; re-testing with a larger panel is the next step.
Larger panelMore subsectors, more years, or finer NAICS detail — directly addresses why Import-Origin Concentration is directionally negative but not statistically significant under any specification tested, including the interaction term above; more cross-sectional units would sharpen statistical power.
Dynamic panel (GMM) specificationArellano-Bond or Blundell-Bond estimation to properly capture persistence in manufacturing output, which a static model cannot.
Medium-Term (new capabilities)
DirectionWhat it would add
Formal dependency networkMap specific foreign suppliers to specific domestic manufacturers and their downstream industries — not just aggregate concentration, but who actually depends on whom.
Economic-impact modelsEstimate disruption effects on prices and employment specifically, not just aggregate output.
Retrospective validationTest the framework against real historical disruption episodes — the 2018–19 tariff actions, the 2020 COVID shock — to see whether it would have flagged them in advance.
Longer-Term (national scaling)
DirectionWhat it would add
Expansion beyond manufacturingApply the same framework to additional sectors (agriculture, energy, services) using the same reusable Python pipeline (see docs/methodology.md).
Formal interface evaluationTest this dashboard's format against alternatives with real policymaker and manufacturer users, rather than assuming this is the right presentation.
Institutional partnershipCollaboration with federal agencies, universities, or industry associations to validate and formally maintain the framework at national scale.
Get involved

This project is open-source under the MIT License specifically so that other researchers, agencies, and manufacturers can extend it. See the GitHub repository for the full codebase, or reach out to the author, Olusoji Adenekan, to discuss collaboration on any of the directions above.